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IN THE .SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STRATFORD L. WENDELBOE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.RICHARD B. JACOBSON, BILLY
JOE LANG, and JOHN H.
DOUGLAS,
Defendants

~and

Case No. 9025

Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIE.F

The plaintiff in the above entitled case respectfully
petitions the court to grant a rehearing on the ground
and for the reasons that the opinion and decision of the
court is erroneous in the following respects:
POINT 1: The court erred in holding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants was reasonably susceptible to the jury's finding in
favor of the defendants. The evidence is clear and convincing that the plaintiff was arrested while trying to
comply with the officers' demand.
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POINT 2: The court erred in holding that Instruction 17, while ill advised and unnecessary, was not prejudicial.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that the court
re-examine the facts and the law to the end that the opinion correctly states such facts and that the law be correctly applied to such facts and the case be reversed.
SUMNER J. HATCH and
RAYS. 1fcCARTY
Attorneys for

Pet~tioner

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
I, Sumner J. Hatch, one of the attorneys for the
petitioner, certify that I have carefully re-examined the
record of the above entitled case and in my opinion the
foregoing petition for rehearing is meritorious. The
record in the case should be re-examined to the end that
the errors alleged in the petition be corrected.

SUMNER J. HATCH
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The petitioner feels that were the opinion and judgment of this court to stand as written in the above entitled case, it would cause great injustice to the plaintiff
and also create dangerous precedents of law.
When this case was argued in the Supreme Court,
it was argued before five justices. When the opinion
came down, the plaintiff for the first time discovered that
the case had been decided by a court of four justices.
Had the plaintiff or his attorneys been consulted, they
would have informed the court that they preferred that
the case be discussed and decided by the full court. The
petitioner respectfully requests that this petition be
considered by, and if granted be heard by, a full court.
POINT I.
THE COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO
THE DEFENDANTS WAS REASONABLY SUSCEPTIBLE
TO THE JURY'S FINDING IN FAVOR OF 'THE DEFENDANTS. THE EVIDENCE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF vVAS ARRESTED WHILE TRYING
TO COMPLY WITH THE OFFICERS' DEMAND.

This court, in paragraph 2 and 3, page 2, Case No.
9025, assumed that the jury made its finding on the basis
of an arrest for failure of the plaintiff to produce a certificate of registration. Even viewing the evidence n1ost
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favorable to the defendants, yes, even taking their evidence alone without considering evidence and testimony
of the plaintiff, there is not evidence to sustain the verdict. The rule of law stated in the Toomer case admittedly is the law, but if the jury makes its decision by viewing the evidence through distorted glasses (faulty instructions such as 7 and 17) the rule does not apply. To
say that the instructions were faulty but not prejudicial
oversimplifies the issue. U.S. v. Morisett, 342 U.S. 276.
With regard to Instruction No.7, the evidence shows,
construing only the defendants' evidence, that the plaintiff when approached by officer Jacobson produced
identification (the driver's license, Exhibit 14). Then,
at Jacobson's request, he proceeded to look for further
identification. At that point, according to Jacobson's
testimony (R. 254-5-6-7), the plaintiff started to go
through the cards in his wallet. After he had passed his
army identification card, Jacobson asked for his registration (R. 256). While '\Vendelboe was "digging for his
registration," Jacobson ordered him out of the car, put
him under restraint, had him put his hands on the police
car, searched him, and then put him in the police car.
An illegal arrest took place at this time. To this place
and time, there is not a scintilla of evidence that the
plaintiff had broken any law, even under Instruction 17,
but from that moment on he was under arrest and actual
physical restraint. By the defendant's own testimony, the
plaintiff had his wallet in his hands "digging for his
registration" when the arrest took place (R. 257).
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Officer Douglas testified that Jacobson asked vVendelboe to get out of the car (R. 328-329). They went to
the police car where Jacobson had hirn put his hands on
top of the police car and searched him, taking a notebook
and flashlight fron1 his trench coat (R. 330).
Officer Lang testified that W endelboe was taken
out of the car, searched, and put in the police car (R. 3545). Also, that Jacobson asked what wrecker he wanted
for his car (R. 355). Lang testified that at the ti1ne
vVendelboe was in his own car, he was not asked for
further identification other than his driver's license (R.
352).
Richard Jacobson in his statement to L. R. Greeson
(Exhibit 20) said:
"While he was fumbling in his wallet, I asked
him to be seated in the police car, that we might
have more light ... Since W endelboe· was reluctant to get into the car, I asked him what he was
doing in that location, and he stated that it was
none of my damn business what he was doing,
stating that he was a citizen, and had a right to he
there.
"At this time, he was advised that he could
consider himself in custody . . . "
In his supplementary report to the record of arrest (Exhibit 19) Jacobson states:
"We attempted to check him out, however,
this man refused to cooperate or answer any
questions. He produced his driver's license. When
asked what he was doing in this area he stated

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
that it was none of our business. He was told
that he could consider himself in custody, and was
directed to sit in the police car."
Again tl~ere is no 1nention or reference to the registration. In the record of arrest (Exhibit 23) it is stated:
"This 1nan was arrested at 3 :00 A.JH. for being drunk and sitting in a car he was taken out of
his car and placed in the police car and suddenly
broke
,, out of the police car and started to fight.
The record of arrest shows charges of assault and
battery, drunk, resisting, and vagrancy, but 1nakes no
reference to the registration. Neither Lang nor Douglas
mention the registration in their reports to the police department (Exhibits 21 and 22). In fact, this aspect of
the case (the registration) never arose until approximately two 1nonths later when various amendments to
the criminal charges were dismissed by the City Court
upon W endelboe's demurrers.
It is apparent from the entire record, and more exclusively from the testimony and reports of the defendants (without considering the plaintiff's evidence), that
the plaintiff was arrested while he was getting information requested by the officers and at a time he had committed no crime whatsoever. All events thereafter were
subsequent to a false arrest.
The arrest took place immediately after W endelboe
told Jacobson that what he was doing in the car was
"none of their business'' or "none of their damn busi-
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ness,'' but as this court held in Myers v. Collett, 1 Utah
2d 406, 268 P(2d) 432:
"Further, there is smne evidence that the
arrest would not have been made had it not been
for the i1npudence of one of the boys toward the
officers, which, of course, is not sufficient as a
breach of the peace to warrant an arrest."
This court, in Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 251
Pac. 23, has set forth the law of arrest in this state. The
law of arrest is further stated in Roe v. Lundstrom, 89
Utah 530, 57 P(2d) 1128, as set forth in plaintiff's brief
on pages 37 and 38.
In State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071, this
court states :
"The decision of the courts are practically
unanimous that whether an officer was authorized
to make an arrest, or whether the arrest was lawful or unlawful, when the facts are not in dispute,
is a question of law for the court."
Looking at the record based on defendants' testimony and reports alone and not considering plaintiff's
testimony, the evidence is clear and convincing that the
plaintiff was arrested at a time when he had broken no
law whatsoever, and the lower court was under a duty
to decide the question of validity of the arrest as a matter
of law and not submit it to a jury under Instructions 7,
9, 10, and 17. The entire evidence considered together
shows only a failure to produce a registration because
the acts of the officers prevented him from producing
that registration which was in his wallet at all times.
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The events transpiring after the illegal arrest, even
though they may have been construed to constitute a
subsequent misdemeanor, could not make valid the illegal
arrest. If W endelboe was arrested for failure to produce
a registration on demand of a police officer, why wasn't
he charged with that offense~ Is it not apparent that
when the arrest could not be justified on any of the
numerous charges which were filed, the City attempted
to rectify the false arrest on the basis that W endelboe
did not instantaneously produce an automobile registration~

POINT 2.
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT INSTRUCTION 17, WHILE ILL ADVISED, UNNECESSARY AND ARGUMENTATIVE, WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

This court, after quoting disconnected portions of the
trial court's Instruction No.17, makes the statement:
"We see nothing in this instruction inconsistent with the la\Y of tlris jurisdiction" Supreme
Court's Opinion 9025, page 2.
and in support of that staten1ent cites 10-6-66, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, 31-1-18, Salt Lake City Ordinances 1955,
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 32-1-31, Salt
Lake City Ordinances 1955. 10-6-66, Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows:
"Police officers- Powers and duties.- All
police officers of any city shall possess the powers
conferred upon constables by law. It shall be the
duty of the police force in any city at all times
to preserve the public peace, prevent crime, detect
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and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in
the public streets, roads and highways, enforce
every law relating to the suppression of offenses,
and perform all duties enjoined upon them by
ordinance.''
See Roe v. Lundstrom, supra. 31-1-18, Salt Lake City
Ordinances, is a word-for-word recitation of 10-6-66, Utah
Code Annotated, citing as a caveat Jackson v. Iiarrves,
65 Utah 282, 236 Pac. 234.
76-28-54, Utah Code Annotated states:
"Resisting or obstructing officers in discharge of duty. - Every person who wilfully resists, delays or obstructs any public officer in discharging, or attempting to discharge, any duty
of his office, when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by fine not exceeding $1,000
or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both.''
See State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 368, 10 P(2d) 1073.
Also see Annotation at 48 A.L.R. 746.
32-1-31, Salt Lake City Ordinances 1955, states:
"Interfering with officer in discharge of duty
prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person in
any way to interfere with, resist, molest or
threaten any officer of Salt Lake City, while in
the discharge of his official duties.''
The trial court in Instruction No. 6 (R. 476) set
forth the law with regard to these statutes and ordinances correctly as follows:
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"You are instructed that it shall be unlawful for any person in any way to interfere with,
resist, molest, or threaten any officer of Salt Lake
City while in discharge of his official duties."
Volume 1, Reid Branson's Instruction to Jury, 1960
Replacement, Section 101, approves quoting of an unambiguous statute or ordinance in an instruction. This
the trial court did in Instruction 6, Instruction 9, and
Instruction 10. This court has stated that impudence or
sauciness to an officer is not a violation substantiating
or authorizing an arrest. Myers v. Collett, supra.
After the statement in Instruction 6, by its Instruction 17 the trial court goes into an argumentative discourse at R. 483 to R. 484 that entirely nullifies and
contradicts Instructions 6, 7, 9 and 10, and leaves such a
state of confusion that said instruction must be prejudicial.
In addition to the often repeated, emphasized
phrases which this court at page 2, paragraph 6, Opinion
No. 9025, admits to be unnecessary, ill advised, and argumentative, the instruction states:
"And such person if he willfully does or says
anything which resists, interferes with, delays
or obstructs the police officer in the legal exercise of his duties, such person at that moment
by such staternen,t or conduct itself is guilty of a
crin1e and public offense." (Instruction 17).
This instruction is not only contradictory to Instructions
6, 7, 9 and 10, so as to be n1isleading (see Y ol. 1, Reid
Branson's Instructions to Jury, 1960 Replacement, Sec-
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tion 104, page 298), but gives undue prominence to a
particular feature or phase of the case (see Reid Branson, supra, Section 105), and gives the law incorrectly
regarding that particular feature in that Instruction 17
states that it is a crime to say anything or make a statement which an officer might regard as interfering, see
Myers v. Collett, supra.
It cannot be denied that under Instruction 17 the
jury could have found the plaintiff liable to arrest due
to his statement "none of your damn business, I have my
rights'' as readily as they could have for a failure to
produce a registration (see Point 1), Konold v. Rvo
Gran.de W. R.R. Co., 21 Utah 379, 60 Pac. 1021.
The instruction further uses the word "possibility"
in lieu of "probability", and uses the phrase that he
"might be about to commit any public offense whatsoever." Reading of the full instruction must necessarily
leave a jury with the idea that if a person should so
much as use the words "just a minute'' to an officer, he
would be subject to arrest for delay and interference.
This instruction cannot be reconciled with the law of
arrest as stated by the court in Instructions 9 and 10
and the last paragraph of Instruction 6. The instruction
not only does not correctly state the law, but has all the
vices denounced by the texts, namely, it is argumentative,
unduly emphasizes one phase of the case, and comments
on the evidence.
It is stated in U.S. v. M oriJsett, supra:
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"Had the jury decided the case and found for
the defendants on proper instructions it would be
the end of the matter, but juries are not bound
by what seems inescapable logic to judges."
In the W endelboe case the jury was out for half a
day, returned the next morning and deliberated for another half day before coming in with a verdict. Under the
instructions complained of in this demand for rehearing
and the plaintiff's original brief, the jury must have
been under a state of confusion which left no other possibility than the verdict arrived at. Due to the erroneous
instructions and the state of the evidence from the record,
a rehearing should be allowed and the case reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons that (1) the evidence is clear and
convincing that W endelboe was placed under arrest and
searched before being given a chance to produce requested registration, and ( 2) Instructions 7 and 17 cannot be
reconciled with Instructions 9 and 10 because Instruction
17 is not or should not be the law of this jurisdiction and
does violence to the constitutional rights of all persons
accosted by police officers, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the court consider this petition and brief and
grant a rehearing of the appeal before a full court.
Respectfully submitted,
SUMNER J. HATCH and
RAY S. 1\!cCARTY
Attorneys for Plai'Yitvff and
Appellant
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